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needs. On the  error- correction view, evolu-
tion equipped us with hierarchical generative 
neural models precisely for the purpose of 
resolving ambiguity. But research on direct 
learning, inspired by ecological psychology 
(Gibson, 1979), and in particular by the the-
ory of direct perception, does not bite the 
Helmholtzian bullet of an inherent ambigu-
ous mind-world linkage. Instead, constraints 
that operate at an ecological scale between 
organism and environment allow for infor-
mation to be specificational. Tau theory (Lee, 
1976) with the direct pickup of informational 
invariants in ambient energy flows, provides 
the canonical illustration of a theory that 
takes this tack. The ecological task then is 
to discover the type of information that is 
specificational for the non-inferential resolu-
tion of the  perceptual problem in question.
Clark’s essay does not contain a single 
reference to Gibson’s work. It is possible 
that Clark endorses the common belief that 
Gibsonian principles might work for per-
ception (best-case scenario), but that they 
are not operant when it comes to learning. 
After all, his is a theory of cognition proper, 
not of perception. In this way, regardless of 
our success in discovering specificational 
information, we are not able to learn non-
inferentially. Rather, we learn because we are 
able to correct our brain’s guesses.
How can we possibly learn, if learning 
entails some form of experience-driven 
change in the behavior of an organism, 
and the perception of affordances is direct?
According to direct learning, learning-
driven changes are themselves specific to 
Gibsonian environmental properties. Note 
however that for any model to constitute a 
genuine cognitive architecture, with fore-
thought as a hallmark, perception and 
action are to be integrated somehow. It is 
reasonable to do so by honoring among 
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Building upon Ashby’s claim that “The 
whole function of the brain is summed up 
in: error-correction,” Clark elaborates an 
integrative “hierarchical generative model” 
of the mind/brain. A Helmholtzian world-
view permeates Clark’s model insofar as it 
presupposes an inherently ambiguous rela-
tionship between mind and world; a rela-
tion that calls for an inferential treatment of 
perception and action. In this short paper, 
we note that embodied cognition offers a 
wider range of approaches to cognition and 
perception than error-correction alone. Two 
areas of research – the synthetic approach 
to embodied cognition (Pfeifer et al., 2008) 
and direct learning (Jacobs and Michaels, 
2007) – serve to highlight what exclusive 
attention to error-correction misses. Our 
view is that perception and action are not 
reducible to error-correction.
Consider the role of the structure of the 
body in action. Clark assumes that action 
operates in a manner similar to percep-
tion with the exception that the reduction 
of error obtains in part non-neurally by 
moving around and thereby altering the 
shape of proprioception and sensory input. 
But actions involve more than action-ori-
ented predictive processing. The synthetic 
approach to embodied cognition explores 
the role of physical structure itself. An 
example is the “Yokoi hand,” a prosthetic 
hand designed with deformable materials, 
such as flexible and soft gripping surfaces 
or artificial tendons arranged in a par-
ticular morphological structure (Yokoi 
et al., 2004). A single instruction from the 
hand’s control system can initiate a range 
of kinds of gripping actions with a range 
of different kinds of objects. In this case, 
the  morphological design itself secures 
that finger tips come together as the hand 
gets closed. Likewise, the very material 
composition of the fingertips conforms 
to the shape of the object to be gripped. 
The morphology of the Yokoi hand carries 
the burden of coping with a wide range 
of behavioral challenges, and the need 
for top-down control, or functions based 
on expectations, for that matter, reduces 
dramatically.
It may be argued nonetheless that this 
approach only works for organisms with 
a relatively limited behavioral repertoire; 
a setting in which it is easier to imagine 
all evolutionarily relevant computational 
challenges being resolved via the physical 
structure of the body itself. For agents with 
more complicated sets of behaviors and 
challenges, it is reasonable to assume the 
involvement of some kind of error-driven 
control system that allows for learning to 
take place. Nevertheless, explanations of 
action will remain incomplete if they do 
not account for the kinds of morphological 
problem solving undertaken by organisms 
at a variety of levels.
More significantly for the advocate of 
error-correction are forms of direct learn-
ing (Jacobs and Michaels, 2007); a natural 
extension of direct perception that devel-
oped from the appreciation that perception 
fails to account inferentially for the adap-
tive capability of organisms (Jacobs and 
Michaels, 2002). Strikingly, direct learning 
can do away with the need to minimize 
errors altogether. How is this possible? The 
error-correction view appears to be unavoid-
able once one assumes that the world does 
not furnish agents with an answer to their 
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other things the functional role of intention 
and  attention, as Clark does in his hierar-
chical model. Interestingly, direct learning 
 incorporates the functional role played by 
intention and attention in early percep-
tion and action. First, the intention of an 
organism, seen from the general ecological 
framework, sets the goals and boundary con-
straints of actions, and hence defines which 
actions can be considered well adapted. 
Intentions are, among other things, related 
to the needs of the organism. Second, atten-
tion, understood ecologically, refers to the 
informational basis of perception and action 
at a particular moment. With respect to the 
adaptation of the organism to the environ-
ment, the education of intention is defined as 
the process by which organisms improve the 
goals that they set for their actions, and the 
education of attention can be understood to 
be the process by which organisms come to 
rely on patterns of information that, given 
the intention, can more adequately serve 
pragmatic purposes (Jacobs et al., 2012).
Clark endorses Marr’s (1982) view of 
the appropriate analysis of levels in cog-
nitive systems. He describes his aim as to 
furnish cognitive science with “a systematic 
approach that addresses the levels of … 
the computation, the algorithm, and the 
 implementation.” Overall, our complaint is 
that Clark’s model must assume ambiguity 
at the computational level, and represen-
tations at the algorithmic level. We hint at 
an alternative: the synthetic approach to 
embodied cognition and the neo-Gibsonian 
theory of direct learning are not commit-
ted to the computational-algorithmic levels 
by rule-following the approximation of a 
pre-established input-output function. In 
our view, the error of the “error-correc-
tion” approach resides in a Helmholtzian–
Marrian failure to appreciate this point.
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